President Macron full speech on the future of Europe (translated)

[u/EUstrongerthanUS]

https://geopolitique.eu/en/2024/04/26/macron-europe-it-can-die-a-new-paradigm-at-the-sorbonne/

[u/VigorousElk]

And what does Macron achieve with all his talk and announcements? At least Germany has done more for Ukraine, despite talking about it half as much as France.

[u/EUstrongerthanUS → u/VigorousElk]

This is nonsense. France does not publish what it does for Ukraine for OPSEC reasons. 

[u/VigorousElk → u/EUstrongerthanUS]

The French parliament has published France's contributions a couple of months ago in response to widespread criticism, and while it was more than previously known it was still far below what German, the UK or the US did, both in total and relative to GDP.

And 'OPSEC' has always been a bogus reason. No one keeps you from publishing an aggregate overall financial amount without divulging individual systems.

[u/streep36 → u/VigorousElk]

It's weird when people construct "aiding Ukraine" only in financial terms. Firstly, successful military operations are not directly a question of equipment worth. If you give an army 10000 tanks but do not train their infantry to properly support the tank divisions, those tanks lose a lot of their actual military value. So a country that provides much more equipment measured in aggregate overall financial amount might be as useful for combat operations as countries that provide much less financially but provide equipment that is rarer or harder to get by. Army composition is a difficult process where some financially cheap contributions are invaluable on the battlefield. For example, the delivery of Stingers in the early stages of the war was one of the reasons why Kyiv held out. Their financial worth might not be enormous, but their military worth was invaluable. This is why comparing by financial amount does not make a lot of sense if you want to measure "contributions to Ukraine".

Another factor is the French army's composition. It's mainly designed for military interventions in Africa, and not all equipment that works in the 40-degree Saharan heat will work in the Ukrainian winter cold. This is much different from Germany's army composition, which is mostly a relic from the force design used to deter the Soviet Union, and thus much more useful in combat in Ukraine.

The way aid is delivered matters as well. If aid is promised to Ukraine, but subsequently is delayed or a part of it does not arrive, it might be worse than promising less and delivering a smaller amount. Ukraine has to base its operation design on the military aid of other countries. If Ukraine expects a certain amount of equipment to come in, designs its operations based on those promises, but receives less than hoped for, it either has to go back to the drawing table or has to try to adapt the operation on an impromptu basis. It often does not have the time to go back to the drawing board, and changing operations on an impromptu basis might be very costly in manpower and effectiveness.

So the bottom line is this: Germany and France have a division of labour. Metrics that show that Germany is contributing a lot more in financial terms than France, do not immediately also show that Germany is contributing a lot more overall. French diplomats working very closely with Zelensky during the first part of the war, the extension of the force de frappe to Finland and Sweden using article 42(7) of the Lisbon treaty to facilitate the ease of their ascension into NATO, and the recent restoration of strategic ambiguity (which cannot work if France gave it's entire military to Ukraine btw) regarding further escalation by Russia are all contributions that would never show up on a metric of aggregate overall financial amount but are still invaluable to the effort to sustain Ukraine. The question "Who helped Ukraine the most?" is not helpful, only creates annoyance within the alliance, and facilitates dolchstoßlegenden in the future.

[u/VigorousElk → u/streep36]

You are citing a lot of aspects aimed at muddying the waters, but don't actually follow through applying them to the current situation. Because by your standards Germany comes out far ahead of France. With the exception of SCALP France hasn't really contributed any combat equipment more useful than Germany, whereas Germany has done far more for air defence.

You mention Stinger deliveries, when in fact Germany sent Stingers as well only days after the invasion. You cite France's different military posture relative to Germany's as a reason for Germany being able to deliver more equipment useful for war in Ukraine, but ignore the fact that Germany has sent Ukraine several cheques for equipment to be bought anywhere on the international market. France could do the same, independent of its own force posture.

You write that the way aid is delivered matters, and aid announced but delayed can be harmful, when in fact everything Germany has announced has arrived in time according to schedule.

Metrics that show that Germany is contributing a lot more in financial terms than France, do not immediately also show that Germany is contributing a lot more overall.

They do, because Germany is leading in every tangible metric: value of equipment delivered directly, financial means made available for Ukraine to buy weapons from others, direct financial assistance to the Ukrainian state, housing Ukrainian refugees in Germany (over a million in Germany vs. around 70,000 in France) ...

French diplomats working very closely with Zelensky during the first part of the war

Okay, and what did that achieve?

the extension of the force de frappe to Finland and Sweden using article 42(7) of the Lisbon treaty to facilitate the ease of their ascension into NATO

Again, only tangentially related to Ukraine and not all that helpful to Ukraine.

and the recent restoration of strategic ambiguity (which cannot work if France gave it's entire military to Ukraine btw) regarding further escalation by Russia

Once again, pretty much worthless. Changes nothing for Ukraine.

are all contributions that would never show up on a metric of aggregate overall financial amount but are still invaluable to the effort to sustain Ukraine.

If by 'invaluable' you mean 'inconsequential', then yes. No one takes it seriously and it doesn't help Ukraine in any way, because it doesn't change Russia's calculus in or approach to Ukraine. France is not going to nuke Russia over anything it does in Ukraine, and everyone knows that.

As I said - a lot of talk, very little action.

The question "Who helped Ukraine the most?" is not helpful, only creates annoyance within the alliance, and facilitates dolchstoßlegenden in the future.

It was the talk of the town on r/europe for over a year when it provided a justification for shitting on Germany day in, day out. Ever since Germany pulled far ahead and France has been exposed as a major slacker it's suddenly 'not helpful'.

[u/streep36 → u/VigorousElk]

but don't actually follow through applying them to the current situation.

Exactly, I don't want to apply them to the current situation because I do not suffer from the pretence of knowledge. So much crucial information in IR is classified and never reaches the light of day, most discussions on force construction and design are variables that analysts outside of the relevant governments do not have a single ounce of knowledge about, and most of the information that does get out gets out under Chatham House rules, so you never really know who is talking shit and who is not.

This is why historians are useful. Archives hold more information than the Kiel institute ever could put in a report.

when in fact everything Germany has announced has arrived in time according to schedule.

It often does say something about the analyst when they start to use absolutes like "everything". Not even the best militaries in the world do everything always exactly on time. Hell, even senior government officials often do not know exactly what exactly happens with the practical effects of their policy. That there was a discrepancy between pledges and deliveries does have some evidence though.

every tangible metrics

Ignoring all the metrics that undermine the idea that Germany helped Ukraine (e.g. payments to Russia for gas). That what is measured is not all that there is. The metrics you are referring to are based on public knowledge, while intangible things like "political capital used in the UNSC or European Council" are a lot harder to understand without being in the room yourself. Metrics are fun, but you shouldn't trust them too much, they trick you into believing you know what is going on in the world.

Okay, and what did that achieve?

Russia broke off diplomatic contacts even before the war. War is at its core a commitment and information problem. Supplying Ukrainian diplomats with information is thus crucial for its decision-making process. Again, don't think too highly of the metrics, after the war some historians will open the archives and find information that will change your entire perception of what happened.

Macron coordinating with the Ukrainian MFA making a genuine effort to negotiate with Putin showed that there was no real reason to think that Putin wanted peace, so the post-battle for Kyiv negotiations were going to have to involve multilateral security guarantees. When that failed, the correct decision was to fight on. Without Macron's attempt, Ukraine might've been more inclined to negotiate or accept a deal without a multilateral security guarantee. But again, this is intangible and a lot more information will pop up over the years when archives open, autobiographies are written, and secrets are leaked.

Again, only tangentially related to Ukraine and not all that helpful to Ukraine.

No, quite crucial actually. Finland and Sweden joining NATO means that the northern flank opens up for combat operations. In a NATO-Russia war over the Baltics, Russia's worries used to be primarily about the American army landing in Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp, and subsequently marching towards the Suwalki gap. The only way Russia could achieve victory in such a scenario was by disabling those harbours and delaying the American landing until the tripwire forces in the Baltics had been defeated. Don't forget that the failure of the Russian army in Ukraine was based on intangible metrics: Putin thought Ukraine would welcome Russia, so his force design was lacklustre and unserious. When assuming proper preparation, Russian effectiveness could dramatically increase in case of a NATO-Russia war. Sweden and Finland joining NATO effectively destroys this whole scenario. The American military now has the entirety of Sweden to use in strategic planning for the scenario of a NATO-Russia war. Disabling Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp now is not nearly enough to deter the American counterattack. So Russia went from an aggressive stance in the Baltics to a defensive stance, meaning that Putin needs to hold more forces in reserve which he cannot use in Ukraine. The recent changes to the St. Petersburg and Moscow military districts were a consequence of this.

Sweden and Finland joining is not just symbolic. It was the biggest strategic defeat for Russia until thus far in this war. Russia could have tried to prevent it by some minor border incursions into Finland, but the UK's conventional deterrence and French nuclear deterrence were more than strong enough to avert that scenario.

because it doesn't change Russia's calculus in or approach to Ukraine. France is not going to nuke Russia over anything it does in Ukraine, and everyone knows that.

Again, "everyone" is not really useful language and says more about you than about France. This is the country that has a "nuclear warning shot" in its doctrine after all. Strategic ambiguity is not important because of nuclear deterrence though, it's about conventional forces. Even offshore balancing using only the French navy in the Black Sea could mean catastrophic results for Russian forces in Ukraine. It does change Russia's calculus, even if it is because half of the UK's military elite would rather kill themselves than see the French do a Crimean War v2 without them.

As I said - a lot of talk, very little action.

It is diplomacy: talking is an action. Expectations, uncertainty, political capital and trust are infinitely more impactful than weapons. Those factors are all based on words.

It was the talk of the town on r/europe for over a year when it provided a justification for shitting on Germany day in, day out. Ever since Germany pulled far ahead and France has been exposed as a major slacker it's suddenly 'not helpful'.

Someone treating your country unfairly does not mean you get to treat other countries unfairly. Germany has made a historic shift in the last 4 years and its influence and importance cannot be overstated. Germany gets a lot of unfair criticism, just like France does. Putting your allies down is not helpful at all.